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Abstract—The online presence projected by a person is com-
prised of all the information about them available on the Internet.
In online communities and social networking services, it is often
possible for third-parties to modify this content by, for example,
commenting on existing content or uploading new content. This
has the potential to negatively impact the privacy of a presence
owner (the person referred to by the on-line content) by disclosing
information about them without consent. In this paper we
propose a Privacy Butler, an automated service that can monitor
a person’s online presence and attempt to make corrections based
on policies specified by the owner of the online presence.
Index Terms—privacy, online presence, social networking
I. INTRODUCTION
As people increasingly interact online, the way a person is
perceived within their peer group, amongst colleagues and by
current (as well as future) employers is affected by the person’s
online presence. This presence is an abstract impression of
a person obtained by collating the online information about
them. Common sources for this information include: social
networking services (like Facebook1 and Twitter2), blog post-
ings, news articles, Wikipedia entries and online photograph
albums such as Flickr3.
In many cases it is possible for the information supporting
a person’s presence to be modified by external parties, often
without the consent of the person identified by the information
(who we term the owner of the online presence). This has
been demonstrated recently on the Wikipedia collaborative
encyclopaedia website where entries for prominent Australian
politicians were vandalised [1]. In the online social networking
context, user modification of content is directly encouraged.
Examples of this, drawn from the Facebook social networking
service, include commenting on a user’s status and tagging
friends in newly uploaded photographs. These unauthorized
modifications can severely impact the privacy of a person, if
sensitive information is disclosed that should not have been.
One example of this is when photographs or comments are
uploaded for everyone (including employers) to see resulting




Within this paper we employ the definition of privacy given
by Minch [3] in which privacy is considered to be the right
of an individual to control how information about them is
collected, stored, used and communicated to other parties.
One possible route to managing privacy is to reduce online
interactions and avoid social networking services. Unfortu-
nately, the prevalence of such services means that such actions
have negative social consequences [4]. Alternatively, it is
possible to manually audit one’s online presence, though this
is increasingly difficult given the rapid proliferation of social
networking sites, blogs and wikis.
In this paper we take the stance that social networking
services and online presence are increasingly a part of modern
society. To reduce the privacy ramifications associated with
using them, we propose the Privacy Butler, an automated
service that can audit a person’s online presence, addressing
the communication aspect of Minch’s definition of privacy.
The service improves user privacy by providing notice of
changes in online content, and facilitates modification of
content that does not meet owner-specified policy. In this way,
the Privacy Butler monitors and controls the online presence
of its owner.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II we discuss the Personal Container technology
supporting the Privacy Butler before providing a detailed
discussion of the butler’s operation in Section III. We then
outline a prototype implementation of the system and provide
an evaluation in Section IV. This is followed by a critical
survey of the related work (Section V) before we conclude
the paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A key aspect of the Privacy Butler is its ability to gather
information from a variety of different online sources. This
functionality is provided by the Personal Container technology
developed previously by the authors [5].
A Personal Container is an advanced lifelogging system
designed to capture and store a record of all the digital data
generated throughout a user’s lifetime. This data can come
from a variety of different sources including: local applications
like Outlook and iPhoto; online services (e.g., Google or
Facebook); as well as devices such as mobile phones.
Data gathering for the Personal Container is performed by
plug-in software components. These plug-ins are programs
(typically a few hundred lines of code) that target a particular
data source, such as an IMAP email server. Plug-ins can
also be written to upload and obtain information from social
networking sites.
Information obtained by each plug-in is dumped into a
database from where it can be searched, mined and accessed
by other applications.
As with all systems that offer large-scale data collection
and storage, there are privacy and security concerns that
arise. Personal Containers address these issues by (1) using
authentication and access control mechanisms to determine
who can access the database and (2) supporting on-disk
encryption of the database rendering it unreadable to those
without the correct decryption keys.
III. THE PRIVACY BUTLER
The Privacy Butler provides a wrapper around a Personal
Container that enhances the functionality by: offering a storage
and evaluation mechanism for presence owner policies, and
including software extensions to modify online content. The
basic operation of the service is shown in the flowchart of
Figure 1.
The major functions performed by the Privacy Butler service
include:
• Capturing the user’s online presence by gathering infor-
mation from online services and websites
• Detecting changes in that online presence and evaluating
the changes with respect to the owner’s policy
• Performing actions based on the results of the evaluation.
This could include: (1) informing the user, and (2)
removing or modifying the offending online content
• Learning from feedback provided by the presence owner
A. Capturing online presence
The Privacy Butler draws heavily on the data collecting
capabilities of the underlying Personal Container framework
in order to profile the owner’s online presence. This Personal
Container uses its plug-ins to gather information from different
sources on the web and stores that information locally in a
database.
Updates on the database (representing changes in online
presence) are also converted by the Privacy Butler to facts.
Facts are items of information about the world expressed in a
form understandable by the system. For example, a new tag
with ID ’tag132323’ on a photograph (with ID ‘photo1’) on
the Flickr service by user ‘Bob’ is converted into the two facts
below:
tag(’tag132323’, ’Alice’, ’Bob’, ’photo1’,
’tag text’).
service(’photo1’, ’Flickr’).
Fig. 1. Flowchart of Privacy Butler operation.
All new facts created by the Privacy Butler are loaded into
a store (referred to as a knowledge base) and evaluated against
the presence owner’s policy.
B. Policy evaluation and resulting actions
In the Privacy Butler system, policies represent formal
descriptions of the owner’s wishes expressed using rules in
the form of Horn clauses. These rules are structured with an
action statement (i.e. the head of the clause) that specifies the
action to be performed when the conditions, provided in the
body of the clause, are satisfied. The head is separated from
the body of the clause with a “:-”. Four example rules are
given below:
//Informs owners if a comment is placed on a
//photo on the Flickr social networking service
//and the comment is not authorized by the owner






//Informs owners about a tag on Flickr that is
//not authorized by the owner
inform(Owner, Photo) :-
tag(Tag_ID, Owner, Tagger, Photo, Tag_Text),
service(Photo, ’Flickr’),
not authorized(tag(Tag_ID, Owner, Tagger,
Photo, Tag_Text)).
//Deletes tags marked for deletion
untag(Owner, Photo, Tag_ID) :-
tag(Tag_ID, Owner, Tagger, Photo, Tag_Text),
delete(tag(Tag_ID, Owner, Tagger, Photo,
Tag_Text)).
//Removes comments marked for deletion





It should be noted that our system considers all new content
not posted directly by the presence owner to be unauthorized.
Policy evaluation results in actions being taken. Actions can
be used to:
• Make modifications to online content
• Initiate communication with presence owners to report
changes in online presence, request permission for a task
or ask for further instruction. This communication can be
performed using third-party services (e.g., Twitter, SMS
or email)
• Make local modifications to the way the Privacy Butler
operates (e.g., start logging comments posted to the
owner’s Facebook account)
These actions, specified in the action statements of rules,
are implemented through system calls to plug-ins. In general,
Privacy Butler can be easily expanded to support new actions
by (1) specifying the rule for that action and (2) providing a
plug-in to support the required actions.
C. Learning from presence owner feedback
Actions performed by presence owners giving permission
or further instruction to the system are fed into a learning
framework which can generate rules to automatically perform
the actions. In the remainder of the paper we will refer to these
as ‘user actions’ to distinguish them from actions as specified
in Privacy Butler policy.
The learning framework performs automatic revision of the
rules based on historical user actions. This can include adding
new rules for special cases or rewriting existing rules to make
them consistent with historical user actions.
A detailed description of the learning process is outside the
scope of this paper, but is provided in Corapi et al. [6].
Support for this learning process within the Privacy Butler
system is a significant benefit of the approach. It enables the
system to start with a simple set of default rules. As user
actions are fed back into the system these default rules can be
revised. With sufficient historical user actions from which to
learn, the system can operate with minimal intervention from
the presence owner.
Manual editing of the rules is also supported for presence
owners that require more control over the system. We are
currently working on a Graphical User Interface to support
this functionality.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section of the paper we present a scenario and then
an implementation to provide the functionality described in
the scenario.
A. Motivational Scenario
Alice returns from a vacation and uploads her holiday
snaps to the Flickr website. Three of her work colleagues,
Bob, Carol and David, add comments and tags to the newly
uploaded photos. Prior to going on holiday, Alice had a
confrontation with Bob. He is still sour about the event and
his tags and comments are quite inappropriate especially since
Alice’s friends and family can also view them. We assume
she is not simply able to unfriend Bob without socio-political
ramifications.
Alice’s Privacy Butler detects the modifications to the
recently uploaded photographs. The Privacy Butler sends Alice
an email informing her of these new tags and comments and
asks which of the modifications should be authorized. Alice
opts to permanently delete all modifications posted by Bob
while keeping the others. The Privacy Butler performs these
user actions and feeds Alice’s choices back into the learning
framework. The Privacy Butler adjusts its rules so that any
future tags and comments on Alice’s Flickr photographs made
by Bob will be permanently deleted from Flickr.
B. Implementation and Evaluation
To provide the functionality described in the motivational
scenario several software components were needed:
• A Flickr service plug-in to add/remove tags and com-
ments on photographs
• A policy evaluation engine
• A user interface to inform the presence owner of changes
in the online presence and request an action to take
For the evaluation four new user accounts were created on
the Flickr website: Alice Example and Bob Example, Carol
Example and David Example. The accounts of Bob, Carol
and David were added to Alice’s friends list enabling them
to view her photographs as well as add tags and comments.
Example photographs were then added to Alice’s account. The
Privacy Butler system was started and set to sweep Flickr every
5 minutes for changes. Each of the three work colleagues’
accounts were then used to manually add tags and comments
on the new photographs.
A Flickr service plug-in was developed in the Python
programming language to interface with Flickr. This plug-in
used a freely available [7] Python version of the Flickr API
via which we could determine all photos in Alice’s collection
modified since the last sweep. This included the photos on
which the work colleagues added tags and comments. These
were then dumped into the Personal Container database under-
lying the Privacy Butler. These updates were also converted
into facts and fed into an expert system for evaluation. For
brevity we only present the fact form of the tags and comments
made on photo1 in Alice’s photo album. These are shown
below:


















The Privacy Butler used a reasoning system implemented in
Prolog to evaluate Alice’s policy. The default rules provided
to the system were those shown in Section III-B. Calls to our
Python plug-in were made from within Prolog by using system
calls.
Fig. 2. Screenshot of the Privacy Butler requesting Alice to authorize recent
modifications to her online presence.
For the purposes of this implementation, a PHP-generated
webpage was used to inform Alice of the modifications to
her Flickr photos and request authorization to keep the tags
and comments. The Privacy Butler system communicated this
webpage URL to Alice via email (orchestrated with the Flickr
plug-in). This webpage is shown in Figure 2.
The user actions indicated by Alice via the webpage were
then performed by the Flickr plug-in. In our scenario Alice
deletes all the comments and tags added by Bob while keeping
all the modifications by Carol and David. Representations of
these user actions were converted into fact form and loaded
into the learning framework.
In our example scenario the learning framework has only
user actions in which all tags and comments from Bob were
deleted. The framework identified the author of the tags and
comments, Bob, as the common factor and added the following
rules to the knowledge base:
untag(Owner, Photo, Tag_ID) :-
tag(Tag_ID, Owner, Tagger, Photo, Tag_Text),
Tagger = Bob.
uncomment(Owner, Photo, Comment_ID) :-
comment(Comment_ID, Owner, Commenter, Photo,
Comment_Text),
Commenter = Bob.
The first rule states that tags from Bob should be automat-
ically removed. Similarly, the second states that all comments
from Bob should be removed.
If more historical user actions were available to the learning
framework, such as other comments posted by Bob that were
not deleted by the presence owner, the learning framework
would seek to find the common link between the deleted
comments that distinguished them from those not deleted. This
could involve analysing the comment text for key words or
phrases. Once the link is identified, an appropriate rule would
be inserted into the knowledge base.
The simple implementation described here offers the func-
tionality required by the scenario outlined above. In doing so,
it demonstrates the utility of a Privacy Butler. It is important to
remember that the Privacy Butler is also able to interact with
other online services (such as Twitter or Facebook) provided
the necessary plug-ins are available. Additionally, the system’s
behavior can be heavily customized. For example, Alice might
prefer all unauthorized modifications of her online presence to
be immediately removed and only reinstated once permission
is given. Alternatively, she could set up the system so that she
only receives notification of changes to her online presence
that contain key words or phrases.
V. RELATED WORK
The related work relevant to the Privacy Butler can be
divided into two groups. The first addresses online presence
and privacy while the second looks at lifelogging tools for
users.
Krishnamurthy and Wills [8] developed a metric to mea-
sure the size of a user’s online footprint. This metric value
was calculated based on the number of aggregator websites
contacted, and how frequently particular aggregators (such as
doubleclick.com) were contacted. The idea behind the work
is that if one visits several websites that provide information
to the same aggregator website, that aggregator can build a
better, and thus potentially more invasive, profile of the user.
The approach is limited in that (1) it applies only to web sites
with embedded advertising that use aggregator services and
(2) it offers no way for presence owners to change what is
stored about them.
In the work of Bylund et al. [9] a Privacy Mirror is pro-
posed. This system is intended to show users what information
about them is available online. The approach is theoretically
based on existing search engine technology (such as Google)
and enables users to maintain and track the parts of their online
information they deem relevant. While offering notice to users,
the approach has no mechanism to respond to changes nor does
it enable presence owners to actively go about shaping their
online presence.
The Addict-o-matic [10] website enables users to search
for terms across a range of websites and social networking
services, providing an implementation of the ideas proposed
in Byland et al.[9].
Google Alerts [11] is a tool intended for companies to track
their online presence. To use the tool, companies register a
callback email address as well as key search terms. Whenever
new content is indexed by Google that matches the search
terms, the company is sent an email on the callback email
address. Similar technology could be used by users to provide
notice of changes in their online presence, though it does not
have access to online social networking sites (which typically
require a login).
A webcrawler-based privacy evaluator was developed by
Jensen et al. [12]. In their approach the iWatch tool is used to
crawl the web searching for P3P [13] data handling policies.
The approach could conceivably be extended to show users
how the sites they interact with handle their data. As with the
other related work listed so far, the approach does not facilitate
management of the online presence by attempting to modify
content.
In terms of the lifelogging functionality employed by Pri-
vacy Butler, there are several items of related work in the field.
Due to space restrictions we only present two prominent items
of work.
The MyLifeBits project conducted at Microsoft Research
[14], [15], [16] examined ways in which a person’s entire life
experience could be digitized. The project yielded an easily
searchable database of information fed by a variety of different
software plug-ins. These plug-ins provided web history, voice
and video recordings, email etc.
Lifelogging is also explored in the Semantic Logger project
developed by Tuffield et al. [17]. Their approach is designed
to aggregate personal information into a knowledge base that
is accessible to context-based systems. Various plug-ins for
the Logger enable it to collect data from user email, calendar
appointments, geo-data and file system information.
A problem with the Lifelogging approaches is that they are
more concerned with capturing their owner’s digital content
(e.g., emails, calendar appointments and photographs) than
monitoring that content for changes by external parties.
As can be seen in this overview of related work, systems
do exist that enable users to monitor their online presence.
Such systems, however, are not capable of responding to those
changes: users still have to manually interact with the online
content to make any desired modifications.
The system that we propose in this paper, Privacy Butler, not
only monitors online presence, but can also act on presence
owner policy to effect changes in online content. A further
benefit of our approach is that it is based on a learning
framework able to learn from past user actions (i.e. what the
presence owner did in similar previous situations) and modify
the presence owner’s policy to better suit their needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
A person’s digital presence is comprised of the information
available about that person on the Internet. This includes
information from social services, blogs, online photograph
albums (like Flickr), etc. In this paper we describe Privacy
Butler, a service to monitor this information and shape it in
accordance with policies specified by the presence owner. In
doing so, we return control over the presence back to the
owner and enable them to manage their online privacy by
(1) providing awareness of the information available about
them online, and (2) offering a means to automatically modify
offensive or disagreeable content.
The Privacy Butler is supported by a Personal Container
- a centralised store of user data. Various plug-ins to the
Personal Container can be used to trawl the Internet (and social
networking sites) for content mentioning the owner. The owner
can then be notified of this content (with the decision to notify
based on rules specified by the owner).
In this paper we have focussed on modifications to content
hosted by social networking services as it is these services
that offer APIs to manipulate user content. The openness of
these APIs varies widely. For example, our choice of Flickr for
the implementation was driven by the need to add or remove
tags and comments from photographs. Such functionality is
not provided in the current Facebook API, which permits
only the addition of tags and not their removal. That said,
it is expected that more functionality will become available
in the future. This is supported by the recent expansions to
the Facebook API that have introduced the ability to add and
remove comments on user uploaded content. This trend of
increasing openness will likely be followed by other social
networking services as interoperability platforms like Google’s
Open Social4 become more widely adopted.
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